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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Proceedings.

This is an appeal from

a summary judgment denying recission of a real estate contract
by the Buyers and Appellants herein, Clark Jenkins, Richard
McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson (hereinafter
"Jenkins group11) and granting the sellers and Respondents
herein, A. Labrum § Sons, Inc., Arvin Bellon, Maurine G.
Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup and Lanis G. Dastrup (hereinafter
"Labrum group") specific performance of the contract.
B.

Statement of Facts.

On December 31, 1980, the

Jenkins group entered into a Real Estate Contract to purchase
an 80 acre parcel of real property located in Duchesne County
from the Labrum group.

Simultaneously, the Jenkins group

purchased an adjoining 80 acre parcel from Marvel Malnar.

In

September of 1982, Deseret Gereration § Transmission
Cooperative, a Utah corporation (hereinafter

M

Deseret!f) filed

an action condemning a 172.4 foot strip through the middle of
both 80 acre parcels of property to construct a high tension,
electrical transmission towers and line.
(hereinafter " R . " ) , pp. 1-5.

Complaint, Record

On December 10, 1982, the Jenkins

group answered Deseret 1 s Complaint and crossclaimed against the
Labrum group for recission of the December 1980 real estate

contract on the first 80 acre parcel.
R., pp. 167-177.

Answer and Crossclaim,

The crosslclaim alledged "frustration of

purpose11 as a basis for recission.

On January 21, 1983, the

Labrum group filed a counter crossclaim against the Jenkins
group seeking specific performance of the real estate contract
between the parties according to its original terms.

Answer to

Crossclaim and Counterclaim, R. pp. 188-206.
As a condition precedent to the issuance of an Order
for Immediate Occupancy on both 80 acre parcels, Deseret
deposited $39,075 with the Court.

Pursuant to the Stipulation

(R., pp. 275-278) dated March 11, 1983, between the Jenkins
group and Labrum group and waivers of the other parties, the
deposit was released and applied to the parties in interest as
follows:
A.

$30,000.00 on the Labrum group contract;

B.

$9,075.00 to the Jenkins group for the Malnar

contract.
On November 1, 1984, eighteen months after disbursal
of the

condemnation deposit, the Labrum group moved for

summary judgment on both the crossclaim and counter crossclaim
with a supporting memorandum, a copy of which is included in
the Addendum as Exhibit "A".

The facts asserted in the motion

and memorandum were uncontested.

On February 8, 1985, a few days prior to oral argument
on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Jenkins group filed an
affidavit alleging an oral accord and satisfaction had occurred
some two years prior.

No motion nor pleadings were ever filed

or amended to reflect the new defense.
Oral argument was held on February 19, 1985, and on
March 19, 1985, Judge Davidson issued a ruling reduced to
judgment on May 22, 1985, finding:

(1) "no cause of action" on

the Jenkins group crossclaim for recission based on frustration
of purpose and (2) granted the Labrum group specific
performance of the contract on their crossclaim.
Exhibit

See Addendum,

,f M
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II.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondents maintain that the trial court's judgment

should be affirmed on three theories:
FIRST.

Although denying any negotiated settlement or

"accord and satisfaction11 was reached, enforcement of an oral
settlement or accord and satisfaction as alleged in the
affidavit of Appellants1 prior counsel is barred by Rule 2.9
(c) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and the
Statute of Frauds.

If the alleged agreement is construed as a

settlement, Rule 2.9 (c) requires stipulated settlements to be

in writing.

If the alleged agreement is construed as an

"accord and satisfaction" the Statute of Frauds mandates the
agreement be in writing.

No facts are alleged in the affidavit

which would remove the alleged agreement from the operation of
the Statute.
SECOND.

The new agreement claimed to have been

reached by Appellants, the Jenkins group, lacked new and
sufficient consideration and is therefore unenforceable.

The

affidavit setting forth the alleged terms of the new agreement,
at best, must rely on disbursal of the condemnation deposit as
new consideration.

Such deposits, however, are for the benefit

of all parties in interest, including lienholders.

In this

instance, the deposit was disbursed to the Labrum group,
lienholders on the property and applied on the existing
obligation of the Jenkins group.

Such acts are insufficient to

constitute consideration for a new agreement.
THIRD.

Appellants failed to timely or properly raise

the affirmative defense of "accord and satisfaction.11

Pursuant

to Rule 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
accord and satisfaction must be pleaded and, if not, is waived.
III.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ENFORCEMENT OF AN ALLEGED ORAL, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

INVOLVING MATTERS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS BARRED, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, BY RULE 2.9(c) OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE
DISTRICT COURTS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The Jenkins group relies solely on the affidavit of
prior counsel, George Diumenti, as a basis for error in the
trial courts granting specific performance of the parties real
estate contract.

The affidavit alleges that during the

pendency of the action (March 1983), the parties fully resolved
all issues raised between them.

(R., pp. 449-451).

Rule

2.9(c) of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts provides:
Stipulated settlements and
dismissals shall be reduced to
writing and presented to the Court
for signature within fifteen (15)
days of the settlement and
dismissal.
The purpose of this rule is, obviously, to lend certainty and
finality to the settlement of pending actions.
If the alleged oral agreement as set forth in the
Diumenti affidavit is construed as a settlement agreement, it
clearly violates the spirit and content of the foregoing Rule
of practice.

The issue of a supposed settlement was not only

oral but was not raised for almost two (2) years after the fact.
Whether the alleged "accord and satisfaction11 is
construed as a modification of the original agreement or a new

agreement, it necessarily involves an interest in real property
and must survive the Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Annotated
§25-5-1.

The affidavit acknowledges, at best, an oral

agreement and an attempt to utilize the disbursal of the
Plaintiff's deposit for obtaining an Order of Immediate
Occupancy as partial performance to defeat the Statute.

No

other claim of performance is contained in the record.
This Court has consistantly maintained that acts
sufficient to constitute part performance and remove an oral
agreement from the Statute of Frauds, must be exclusively
referable to the oral contract.

Woolsey v. Brown, Utah, 439

P.2d 1035 (1975); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d
278 (1954).

In the Roth ! s Estate case the Court further stated

that the part performance must be reasonably explicable only on
the postulate that a contract exists.
In this instance, disbursal of a deposit of a
condemning authority prior to trial among the owners and
lienholders, without changing their contractual relationship,
is the rule rather than exeption.

As provided in Utah Code

Annotated, §78-34-9 relating to such deposits, upon the
application of parties in interest, the Court shall order the
deposit to be paid forthwith and. . "shall make such orders in
respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance

and other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable."
The Labrum group had a lien exceeding $200,000.00 on
80 acres of the 160 acres of land affected by the
condemnation.
167-177.

Exhibit A to Answer and Crossclaim, R., pp.

The value of their security was greatly deminished by

the taking of Deseret.
paragraph 11.

Answer and Crossclaim, R., pp. 167-177,

Application of the deposit to the contract

lienholder as per the Stipulation, R., pp. 275-278 was the
normal and logical action, in and of itself, and not only
explicable on the postulate that a new oral "accord and
satisfaction" existed.
POINT II
THE JENKINS GROUP'S PURPORTED ORAL ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION MUST FAIL FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
The affidavit relied on by the Jenkins group when
viewed in a light most favorable to them fails as a matter of
law to establish the necessary elements of a contract of accord
and satisfaction.

Such contracts require all the essential

elements of contracts generally, including, new and sufficient
consideration.

Sugar House Finance Co. v. Anderson, Utah, 610

P.2d 1369 (1980).
insufficient.

To do what one is already bound to do is

The consideration recited in the affidavit

-7-

relied on by the Jenkins group was a stipulation to disburse a
portion of the condemnation deposit to the Labrum group.

Since

all parties in interest had potential claims to the deposit and
the deposit was applied by stipulation on existing, undisputed
obligations of the Jenkins group, it is insufficient to support
a new agreement.
POINT III
THE JENKINS GROUP FAILED TO TIMELY AND PROPERLY RAISE
THE DEFENSE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the affirmative defense of accord and
satisfaction be set forth specifically in the pleadings and
Rule 12(h) provides that a party wavies all defenses which are
not so pleaded.

Phillips v. JCM Development Corporation, Utah,

666 P.2d 876 (1983); Hintze v. Seaich, Utah, 437 P.2d 202
(1968).
The only effort to raise the defense of accord and
satisfaction by the Jenkins Group was in the form of an
affidavit in opposition to the Labrum Group's Motion for
Summary Judgment filed shortly before oral argument.

As noted

by this Court in Sugar House Finance Company case at Page 1371,
a party may raise the defense of accord and satisfaction by
properly pleading the same as a defense, or in the alternative,

-8-

may seek to enforce an accord and satisfaction by appropriate
motion or independent action seeking affirmative relief from
the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The Jenkins Group has not availed itself of any of

the foregoing procedures.

The supposed "accord and

satisfaction11 was purportedly entered into almost two years
prior to the filing of the affidavit opposing summary
judgment.

During this period of time, the Jenkins Group failed

to even attempt to amend their pleadings despite the
continuation of the litigation.

The Labrum Group finally filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 1, 1984, asking the
Court to decide the only issue raised by the pleadings.

Is

fl

fustration of purpose11 a basis for recission of the contract?

Some three and one-half months later and only a few days prior
to oral argument, the Jenkins Group filed their affidavit
alleging the accord and satisfaction.
Although liberality in pleading is the rule of the
day, some line must be drawn to give any meaning to Rules 8(c)
and 12(h).

Failure to even attempt to plead a defense known to

the Jenkins Group for almost two years surpasses the limits of
liberality in pleading.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment on the Jenkins Groupfs crossclaim
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requesting recission on the grounds of "frustration of purpose"
should be affirmed together with the summary judgment granting
specific performance on the Labrum Group's counter crossclaim.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of November, 1985.
LABRUM $ TAYLOR

MICHAEL R. LABRUM
LABRUM § TAYLOR
108 NORTH MAIN STREET
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
Telephone: 896-6484
Attorney for Respondents
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herewith and hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondents were placed in the United
States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage
thereon fully prepaid, this 11th day of November, 1985,
addressed to John P. Ashton and Natasha Matkin, PRINCE, YEATES
§ GELDZAHLER, Attorneys at Law, 424 East Fifth South, Third
Floor MONY Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

MICHAEL R. LABRUM
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EXHIBIT "A"

MICHAEL R. LABRUM
LABRUM & TAYLOR
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
Bellons, A. Labrum and Sons,
Inc., and Dastrups
108 NORTH MAIN
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
896-6484
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DESERET GENERATION &
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERRON ELDER, et al.,
Defendants.

*

*

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS A. LABRUM AND SONS, INC.,
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G. BELLON,
B. CURTIS DASTRUP AND LANIS D.
DASTRUP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

*

Civil No.

*
*

7732

*

COME NOW Defendants ARVIN L. BELlON,TAURINE G.
BELLON, A. LABRUM AND SONS, B. CURTIS DASTRUP and LANIS D. DASTRUP
and submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in
support of their motion for summary judgment against Defendants
Clark Jenkins, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay
Johnson on said parties' crossclaim and movants counter crossclaim.
FACTS
On or about December 31, 1980, Defendants Clark Jenkins,
Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson

(hereinafter

"Purchasers") entered into a written contract for the purchase of
certain real property and water rights from Defendants Arvin L. Bellon,
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Maurine G. Bellon, A. Labrum and Sons, Inc., B. Curtis Dastrup
and Lanis D. Dastrup (hereinafter "Sellers"), a copy of said contract
being attached

hereto

and incorporated herein by this reference.

The effect of a condemnation was not provided for in the terms of
the contract.

Purchasers paid a down payment of $70,000.00 and

pursuant to Paragraph 6 of said agreement, took possession as of
the date of the contract.

Purchasers werp d^^d^d t^n (10)

anrpq

pursuant to the partial release provision or said contract.

Purchaser

failed to make the October 15, %1981, payment in the amount of
$33,302.05 and by subsequent agreement on the 21st day of October,
19 81, were granted an extension to December 1, 1981, on said
payment.

Purchasers failed to satisfy the 19 81 payment on the

extension date or any subsequent payments.

Purchasers failed to

satisfy property taxes on the property for the year 19 81 and
subsequent periods as required by the contract.
On or about September 19, 19 82, Plaintiff, Deseret
Generation & Transmission Cooperative, initiated a condemnation
action condemning portions of the property which were the subject
matter of Purchasers and Sellers agreement for the purpose of installing a power line.

On or about December 21, 1982, Sellers served

notice of default on Purchasers.

Purchasers have neither paid nor

tendered the delinquencies on the contract.
Purchasers named as Defendants in the condemnation filed
a crossclaim against Sellers requesting termination of the contract

-3-

and refund of monies paid on the grounds of frustration of purpose,
impossiblity of performance or destruction of the purpose and object
of the contract.

Sellers answered said crossclaim denying the same

and counterclaimed for specific performance of the contract,
POINT I.
CONDEMNATION OF REAL PROPERTY IS A REASONABLY FORSEEABLE
EVENT AND CANNOT, THEREFORE, TRIGGER APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE IN ORDER TO AVOID PERFORMING UNDER AN
EXECUTORY CONTRACT.
The crossclaim of Purchasers when reduced to its
essential elements claims that Purchasers bought property from
Sellers for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision;
that twenty (20) months thereafter, a public utility condemned a
portion of the property subject to the contract and that Purchasers1
purpose and the purpose of the contract, i.e. subdivision i s ,
therefore, frustrated or interfered with and Purchasers should be
permitted to rescind the contract on the principle of ^frustration
of purpose.

The doctrine of frustration of purpose was examined by

the Utah Supreme Court in Castagno vs. Church, Ut., 552 P2nd 1282 (19
wherein the Court observed:
"The applicability of this doctrine depends on the
total or nearly total destruction of the purpose for
which, in the contemplation of both parties, the
transaction was made. Although performance remains
possible, the expected value of performance to the
parties seeking to be excused has been destroyed,
by a fortuitous event which supervenes to cause an

-4-

actual, but not literal failure of consideration.
Where the defense of frustration is proper, the
issue is whether the equities, considered in the
light of sound public policy requiring placing
the risk of destruction or disruption of the
contract equilibrium on the Defendant or the
Plaintiff."
The Court goes on to state that if the event was not
reasonably foreseeable, then it is the type of supervening
fortuitous event which may be raised in terms of frustration
of purpose.

However, if the event was foreseeable, it should

have been included in the contract and the absence of such
provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.
The burden is upon the moving party to show that the risk was
not reasonably foreseeable.

Frustration of purpose is no

defense if the event is foreseeable.

Castagno vs. Church, supra.

In the instant case, the issue is reduced to whether
the risk of the event that has supervened to cause the alleged
frustration was reasonably foreseeable.

It is common knowledge

that many real estate contracts provide for allocation of the
risk in the event of a condemnation by a sovreign entity.

The

instant contract made no such provision, and in the absence thereof,
Utah cases have consistently held that the Purchasers have assumed
such a risk and are entitled to the award, together with any
increase or decrease in the value of the property, subject only
to the Sellers1 continuing lien.

Brigham City vs. Rich, 34 Utah 130

-597 P 2nd 220 (1908); Jelco, Inc., vs. Third Judicial District
Court, Utah, 511 P 2nd 739 (1973).

See 27 ALR 3rd 572, 592-597.

As stated in the Jelco case above:
"Thus, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, where a condemnor takes land subject
to an executory contract, it is the vendee who
is normally entitled to any condemnation award
for the land so taken. It is he who is entitled
to the benefit of any increase and who must bear
the detriment of any decrease, in the value of
the property; whereas, the vendor (Jeremy) has
only legal title.
. . .he (vendor) is, of course,
also entitled to retain the legal title as
security for its performance, and in case of
default, to seek the remedies provided therein."
In the present case, there is one additional factor
which makes such a conclusion even more demanding.

The Purchasers,

pursuant to a partial release clause in the contract, have already
received legal title to ten (10) acres of the property subject to
the contract, as well as the condemnation.
CONCLUSION.

The Sellers are entitled to specific

performance of the contract as written.

The Court should find

no cause of action on Purchasers1 crossclaim.
POINT II.
PURCHASERS, UNDER AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT, WHO HAVE TAKEN
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND RECEIVED LEGAL TITLE TO
PORTIONS THEREOF ARE THE "OWNERS" OF THE PROPERTY AND MUST BEAR
ALL INCREASES OR DECREASES IN VALUE THEREOF.
The Jelco case, supra, involved a situation very similar

to the instant case.
was condemned.

Property, subject to an executory contract,

The Purchasers had received equitable title to all tt

property and legal title to portions thereof.

No provision in the

contract provided for allocation of risk in the event of eminent
domain proceedings.

The Supreme Court in reviewing the situation

noted unequivocally that a purchaser under an executory contract
acquired all incidents of ownership, except legal title, and in
equity is regarded as the owner of the property.

Absent any provisi<

in the contract to the contrary, a purchaser, as owner, is entitled
to any increase in the value of said property, as well as must
bear detriment of any decrease in the value of said property.

This

proposition was again upheld in Utah State Medical Association vs.
Utah State Employees Credit Union, Utah, 655 P 2nd 643 (1982).

The

Court in that case stated that the purchaser bears risk of any loss
depreciation to property, based on a principle of equitable ownershi
absent the vendor's fault or negligence.

The only way the parties

may shift this burden is by provision in the contract to the
contrary.

Although not specifically adopted in the State of Utah,

the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act represents a condensation
of general law in such matters and under Section 1, Subparagraph (b)
states:
"If, when either the legal title or the possession,
of the subject matter of the contract has been
transferred, all or any part thereof is destroyed
without fault of the vendor or is taken by eminent
domain, the purchaser is not, thereby, relieved from
a duty to pay the price, nor is he entitled to recover
any portion thereof that he has paid."

-7-

In the present case, the Purchasers were granted
possession of the subject matter in 1980, legal title to
ten (10) acres of the subject matter was subsequently conveyed
pursuant to the partial release provision.

Purchasers have

assumed all incidents of ownership and there was clearly no
fault or negligence on the part of the Sellers which precipitated
the condemnation.
CONCLUSION.

The Purchasers under the executory contract

are the owners of the property and entitled to any proceeds
drived from the condemnation action, subject only to the
lien of Sellers.

Sellers are entitled to specific performance

of the agreement as written and Purchasers1 crossclaim for
recision should be dismissed for no cause of action.
DATED:

November 1, 19 84.
LABRUM & TAYLOR

EXHIBIT "B"

ROBERT F. ORTON
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CKTY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800
MICHAEL R. LABRUM
LABRUM & TAYLOR
108 NORTH MAIN STREET
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
TELEPHONE: (801) 896-6484
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS, AL LABRUM & SONS, INC., B. CURTIS
DASTRUP, LANIS D. DASTRUP, ARVIN L. BELLON & MAURICE G. BELLON
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DESERET GENERATION & TRANSMISSION CO-OPERATIVE, a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.
FERRON ELDER, et al., *
Defendants.

*
*
*
*

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO
DEFENDANT'S CROSSCLAIM AND
COUNTER CROSSCLAIM

*

Civil No.

7732

*

This matter having come before the above-entitled Court
on the 19th day of February, 1985, at the Duchesne County Courthouse,
Duchesne, Utah, on the Honorable Richard C. Davidson, District Judge
presiding, pursuant to Defendant's Bellon, Labrum and Dastrups Motion
for Summary Judgment on the Crossclaim of Defendants Jenkins,
McCarver, Mabey ahd McRay and the Counter Crossclaim of movants herein;
Defendants Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRay appearing by counsel,
David K. Broadbent and John P. Ashton, Esquires of Prince, Yeates
& Geldzahler, and the Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup appearing

by counsel Michael R. Labrum of Labrum and Taylor, and the Court
having examined the files, pleadings and memorandum in support and
opposition to said motion and having heard the arguments of counsel
and being fully advised in the premises and having rendered a ruling
in the matter9
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup are entitled to
and are hereby granted specific performance of the real estate
contract with Defendants Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRay.
2.

Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup are entitled to

and are granted a judgment of "no cause of action" on Defendants
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRayfs crossclaim.
DATED this ^ ^

day of &jk^L, 19 85.
BY THE COURT

jsi
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Summary
Judgment as to Defendant's Crossclaim and Counter Crossclaim was
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this /{
day of April, 19 85, addressed to:
David K. Broadbent, Esq.
John P. Ashton, Esq,
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
24 East 5th South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Robert F. Orton
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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